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"OUTRAGEOUSNESS" AND PRIVILEGE IN THE
LAW OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS-
A SUGGESTION
Charles B. Hockman'
The fashioning by the courts of a new tort for the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress in recent years has presented another area of
the law in which liability is imposed for the use of words which have
socially undesirable effects. The purpose of this article is to explore the
relation of this development to the law of defamation and to indicate
one respect in which traditional principles of defamation may be able
to serve as a guide for the future refinement of the rules governing the
new tort.
In considering liability for the infliction of emotional distress, courts
are confronted with the conflict between two important interests-
(1) the interest of the individual in his "peace of mind" or his right to
be free from serious invasions of his mental and emotional tranquility
and (2) the public and private interest in the free expression of informa-
tion and ideas.
Although mental distress has long been recognized as an element of
damages when some other interest of the plaintiff has been invaded,1
only recently have courts been willing to recognize invasions of peace
of mind as an independent basis for tort liability. Undoubtedly, this
development2 has been influenced by the increasingly higher standard
which society has imposed for socially acceptable conduct. Perhaps
even more important in influencing the imposition of liability for the
infliction of emotional distress have been the advances in medical science
showing that emotional and mental injuries can be just as harmful as
those physical injuries which the courts have traditionally redressed.3
The courts, however, have been unwilling to give the same protection to
peace of mind as they have afforded the interest in being free from bodily
harm.
This reluctance is caused partly by the same fears which originally in-
fluenced courts in refusing to grant recovery for emotional distress. Be-
cause of the intangible nature of the injury judges were afraid of en-
couraging fictitious or trivial claims. Also contributing to this fear were
distrust of the kind of proof offered to substantiate claims of emotional
t See contributors' section, masthead p. 69, for biographical data.
I See McCormick, Damages § 88 (1935).
2 Perhaps the classic article in this field is Magruder, "Mental and Emotional Disturbance
in the Law of Torts," 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033 (1936).
3 See Smith, "Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease," 30 Va. L. Rev. 193 (1944).
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injury-often the only testimony of injury came from the plaintiff's own
relation of his mental anguish-and the sympathy of juries toward the
pregnant women and elderly persons who are often plaintiffs in these
cases. Even though the courts were willing to recognize that these ob-
jections, which actually are more of a commentary on the ability of the
courts to handle these cases than on the desirability of providing redress
for this kind of injury, are not insuperable in the light of modern medical
knowledge and even though the trial judge can exert a strong hand in
controlling the jury's discretion, they have refused to extend full pro-
tection to the interest in peace of mind. The tentative draft of the RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) probably reflects accurately the cases
when it suggests that liability will be imposed only for the intentional or
reckless infliction of emotional distress; negligently inflicted emotional
distress states a cause of action only if forseeable physical injury results.4
This refusal to impose liability for negligently inflicted emotional
distress can perhaps be explained on the ground that only if the defend-
ant intends to inflict severe emotional distress, is it reasonable to hold
him liable.5 To- the extent that this reasoning reflects the idea that the
greater the defendant's moral culpability, the greater should be his
liability, it seems sound; however, the argument that it is easier to assure
the genuineness of plaintiff's injury when the defendant acts intention-
ally than when he acts negligently seems neither logically nor empirically
sound. Perhaps a more satisfactory explanation is that the courts are
concerned with the undesirable effects of imposing liability for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress. For example, the comment to
the proposed revision of the RESTATEMENT points out;
There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where some-
one's feelings are hurt. There must still be freedom to express an un-
flattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left through which
irascible tempers may. blow off relatively harmless steam.6
The tentative draft of the new RESTATEMENT again reflects accurately
the interest in the free expression of ideas in suggesting that liability is
imposed only when the defendant's conduct has been "so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds
of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community."' 7 Moreover, in order to keep minor annoyances
4 Restatement (Second), Torts §§ 46, 313 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1, 4, 1957); see Prosser,
"Insult and Outrage," 44 Cal. L. Rev. 40 (1956).
5 Cf. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286
(1952).
6 Restatement (Second), Torts § 46, comment d at 23 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957);
see Magruder, supra note 2; State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, supra note 5.
7' Restatement (Second), Torts § 46, comment d at 22 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957).
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and petty grievances out of court, liability will be imposed only when
the injury which the defendant intended to inflict can be characterized
as "severe") emotional distress. The two requirements that the defend-
ant's conduct be "outrageous" and that plaintiff's injury be "severe" are
very ambiguous and consequently afford a jury instructed in these terms
great leeway in determining liability. Since this discretion in the jury has
historically, and to some extent justifiably, troubled the courts, one of
the primary objectives in this field should be the development of more
definite standards in applying these two requirements. Whether a more
precise definition of the requisite degree of emotional distress can be
developed than the present requirement of severity is doubtful; reliance
will probably have to be placed on the trial judge to exercise the necessary
control over the jury.
As for the requirement that the defendant's conduct be outrageous,
one possibly fruitful avenue of inquiry does not seem to have been
considered by the courts. This is the approach adopted in the area of
defamation in which the courts have been called upon to accommodate
the public and private interest in the free expression of ideas and
opinions with another important interest, the individual's interest in
his reputation. This latter interest is given broad protection by those
rules which make it quite easy for a plaintiff to establish his case. For
example, the definition of what is defamatory is very broad; the plaintiff
can recover even though he does not prove actual damages through in-
jury to his reputation; and liability is imposed in many cases even though
-there is no element of fault in the defendant's conduct.' The public and
private interest in free expression is protected by certain well-developed
privileges. In addition to the absolute privileges applicable to statements
made in the course of judicial or legislative proceedings or by executive
officials,' a defendant who has acted with an honest or reasonable belief
in the truth of his statements has a valid defense if they were uttered to
further a legitimate purpose. Thus, qualified privileges are available if
the defendant was acting to protect a valid interest of his own,10 or the
interest of a third party to whom he owes a legal or moral duty of pro-
tection," or if he was commenting on a matter in which the public has a
8 See generally Harper & James, Torts §§ 5.1-5.20 (1956) ; Prosser, Torts §§ 92-94 (2d ed.
1955).
9 See, e.g., Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Or. 61, 74 P.2d
1127 (1938).
10 See, e.g., Brow v. Hathaway, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 239 (1866); 1 Harper & James,
Torts § 5.26 (1956).
11 See, e.g., Fresh v. Cutter, 73 Md. 87, 20 Atl. 774 (1890) ; Prosser, Torts § 95, at 615-19
(2d ed. 1955).
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legitimate interest, 2 provided the defendant's conduct was reasonably
related to the protection of the interest for which ihe privilege is
accorded.'"
It is submitted that the courts could profitably consider these privi-
leges,' 4 or something closely akin to them, in future cases involving the
intentional infliction of emotional distress. That these privileges have
been developed and applied in the context of a tort designed to protect
reputation rather than peace of mind certainly should not bar their use
in actions for emotional distress. In both of these areas of tort law the
underlying objective is to accommodate the interest in the free exchange
of ideas with the interest in protecting those persons adversely affected
by this exchange. No reason appears why the introduction of the defense
of privilege'5 could not serve a useful purpose when plaintiff claims an
invasion of his interest in peace of mind rather than an attack upon his
reputation. 16
When one considers the policy considerations which the "outrageous-
ness" requirement is intended to implement, it becomes clear that the
qualified-privilege approach is much more satisfactory. One reason often
given for imposing liability only where the defendant's conduct can be
characterized as outrageous is expressed in comment (d) to the proposed
revision of section 46 of the RESTATEMENT:
[L]iability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoy-
ances, petty oppressions or other trivialities. The rough edges of our
society are still in need of a good deal filing down, and in the meantime
plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a
certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely
inconsiderate and unkind.
1 7
12 See, e.g., Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 86 N.W. 323 (1901). One
important qualification on this privilege is stated in Prosser, supra note 10, at 621-22:
Some three-fourths of the courts which have considered the question have held that
the privilege of public discussion is limited to opinion, comment or criticism, and
does not extend to any false assertion of fact.
13 See generally id. Prosser, supra note 10, at 625-29.
14 Of course, the absolute privileges available to a defendant in a defamation action
would also be applicable when the plaintiff claims damages for intentionally inflicted
severe emotional distress.
15 Much of the discussion in this article will focus on the desirability of adopting the
qualified-privilege approach in the law governing emotional distress. This, however, is
merely to facilitate discussion of the manner in which the conflicting interests involved can
best be accommodated. The author feels that the defense of the absolute privilege should
be utilized here, as in the area of defamation, in those instances in which the interest the
defendant was advancing is considered so strong as to outweigh in substantially all instances
the interests of the plaintiff which the tort is designed to protect.
16 The fact that liability is only imposed for the intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress while a defendant may be held liable for libel or slander upon a lesser showing of
fault is immaterial. The defendant's fault is relevant to the requirements which plaintiff
must meet to establish a prima face case for recovery and relevant in determining whether
a qualified privilege has been abused, but seems to have little bearing on whether a qualified
privilege should be made available.
17 Restatement( Second), Torts § 46, comment d at 23 (Tent Draft No. 1, 1957).
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Although this observation undoubtedly states a valid policy consideration
and represents an accurate summary of the present state of case law, it
is difficult to see that the requirement of "outrageousness" is the most
rational manner of implementing it. If the concern is that the plaintiff
may not have suffered more than a petty annoyance, is not this the very
factor which the requirements of intention to inflict harm and severity
of distress are designed to guarantee? The concern should be
with the nature of the plaintiff's injury rather than the nature
of the defendant's conduct. It has been argued that in light of the great
fear of permitting recovery for a feigned or trivial claim, requiring the
defendant's conduct to be outrageous is an effective means of assuring
the severity of the plaintiff's injury; if the defendant's conduct merely
represents the kind of petty annoyance which we all must endure, it is
extremely unlikely that the plaintiff has been seriously distressed."8 Even
though it be admitted that the nature ol the defendant's conduct may have
some probative value in determining the nature of the plaintiff's injury,
it does not follow that the only time one can be sure that the plaintiff
has been sufficiently distressed is when the defendant's conduct can be
characterized as outrageous. It is certainly conceivable that the plaintiff
will be able to establish the severity of his emotional distress through
other proof, such as by the use of medical testimony.'9 For this reason
a simple instruction that the jury should consider the nature of the de-
fendant's conduct in addition to any other relevant evidence in deciding
whether the plaintiff's injury satisfies the requisite degree of severity
would be preferable to the fixed requirement that the plaintiff can only
recover if the defendant's conduct can be characterized as outrageous.
If the "outrageousness" requirement is to have any validity, it must
be justified on grounds other than those discussed above. One important
function which it might serve is suggested when one considers why a
defendant who intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress should
ever escape liability. The reason must be that there are circumstances
in which to permit recovery for an invasion of peace of mind would be
to encroach upon interests of either the defendant or the general public
which are sufficiently important to outweigh the plaintiff's interest in ob-
taining redress. An obvious example would be the case in which an at-
torney during the course of a trial subjected his adversary's witness
to extreme embarrassment on the witness stand. Certainly, in this case
the attorney should have a defense to an action for the intentional inflic-
18 See Prosser, "Insult and Outrage," 44 Calif. L. Rev. 40, 44-45 (1956).




tion of emotional distress.20 One way to express this defense is to say
that his conduct was not outrageous under all the circumstances, but this
statement merely conceals the real reason-the overriding interest in
an attorney's zealous presentation of his client's case in court.
Although this is perhaps an extreme example, it is submitted that the
same reasoning applies in most cases in which the defendant's conduct
was not sufficiently outrageous under the circumstances. Cases involving
overzealous creditors or collection agencies are a good example.21 In
determining whether the creditor's conduct is outrageous, the jury is told
to consider all the circumstances of the case. In particular, was the
creditor trying primarily to collect his money or was he sadistically sub-
jecting the plaintiff to embarrassment? Was there any dispute as to the
validity of the debt? The jury is then asked to give a gestalt reaction as
to whether, lumping all these factors together, his conduct was outrageous.
A more sensible and straightforvard way to strike a balance between
the interests involved would be to talk in terms of qualified privilege and
the abuse of this privilege. The inquiry would be whether the defendant
had invaded the plaintiff's interest in peace of mind by intentionally
subjecting him to severe emotional distress, and if he had, was he justified
in so doing. If the defendant had a privilege to pursue his own interest,
did his conduct exceed the bounds of this privilege? At the very least,
this type of approach would facilitate clarity of analysis by giving a more
defined content to and explicit recognition of the interests which the
Ccoutrageousness" requirement is intended to implement.
A desirable by-product of the qualified-privilege approach would be
that by clarifying the interests at stake in a particular case, it would per-
mit instruction of the jury in more precise terms as to the issues involved.
Under the RESTATEMENT view the jurors are asked for a basically emo-
tional reaction as to whether a recitation of the defendant's conduct
moves them to exclaim "Outrageous!" In addition to the disadvantages
of inviting the jury to decide on an emotional basis the standard is so
vague and indefinite that persons are likely to be in substantial disagree-
ment as to what is meant by "outrageous" and whether the defendant's
conduct, even given an adequate definition of outrageousness, is suffi-
ciently gross to meet this standard. It must be admitted that the law
often must, and perhaps even should, deal in vague and general stand-
ards of conduct; the reasonable-man test may be cited as a standard
quite susceptible to different interpretation. But even when this is recog-
nized it is submitted that the adoption of a qualified-privilege approach
20 Cf. Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Or. 61, 74 P.2d 1127 (1938).
21 E.g., Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932).
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would eliminate much of the unnecessary fuzziness inherent in the
"coutrageousness" test and thereby reduce the opportunity for inconsis-
tent and arbitrary results in this area of the law.
The cases in which the "outrageousness" requirement apparently serves
its greatest function are those involving the thoughtless practical joker
whose perverted sense of humor results in disastrous consequences to
his victim.2 2 It might be argued that in this area, at least, the "out-
rageousness" requirement presents a manner of separating the ostensibly
harmless practical joke which results in disastrous consequences from
the more sadistic of the species. To speak of a privilege to perpetrate
practical jokes would not make much sense since the defendant would
not be acting to further any interest of his own or anyone else. The
problem here is to establish the point at which the. general interest in
freedom of action should be limited because it comes in conflict with a
legitimate interest of another. Certainly, it is plausible to say that de-
fendant's freedom of action should be limited when an average member
of the community would deem it outrageous. However, even in this
situation it is submitted that the qualified-privilege approach is to be
preferred. The conclusion would be that the defendant has no privilege
to escape liability for severe emotional distress, intentionally or recklessly
caused. That defendant will not be subject to liability unless he acted
at least in conscious disregard of a high degree of probability that serious
emotional distress would be produced by his conduct2 3 seems to provide
adequate protection for the general interest in freedom of action. Indeed,
to require outrageousness in this area might perhaps be to introduce a
superfluous requirement; the mere fact that the defendant intentionally
or recklessly caused severe emotional distress in another for no good
reason seems sufficient to dub his conduct outrageous.
Of course, an argument can be made that, even given the advantages
of the qualified-privilege approach over the "outrageousness" test, the
latter should be retained because it affords greater protection to the
interests served by encouraging persons to express their ideas and opinion
freely and by permitting persons to blow off a little harmless steam on
occasion. It is undoubtedly true that the "outrageousness" test probably
makes it more difficult to recover than would the qualified-privilege
approach, because even in situations in which the defendant has a
22 For a particularly extreme example, see Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37
(1920).
23 This assumes that the Tentative Draft of the Restatement is correct in suggesting that
there should be liability for the reckless infliction of severe emotional distress. If liability
is to be imposed only for an intentional tort, the protection of the defendant's freedom of
action is correspondingly greater.
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qualified privilege a finding that the privilege had been abused would
probably require a lesser showing of gross conduct than would a finding
of outrageousness. It is extremely difficult to meet such an argument in
favor of the "outrageousness" test because it depends essentially on a
judgment of the weight to be accorded a particular interest and a guess
as to whether the qualified-privilege approach would impose undue re-
straints on the expression of ideas and opinions. It is suggested, however,
that in no other area of tort law has it been found necessary to go beyond
an intent requirement to protect the interest in the free expression of
ideas. This interest has long been protected by the qualified-privilege
approach in defamation cases, and a defendant who communicates his
opinions to persons other than the plaintiff is certainly more likely to
gain an impartial evaluation of and wider dissemination for his ideas
than the defendant in a typical emotional-distress case. Moreover, to the
extent that the defendant was seeking to protect a legitimate interest, he
would be protected under the qualified-privilege approach, even though
he intentionally caused severe emotional distress to the plaintiff, provided
only that his conduct was reasonably related to the advancement of that
interest. As to the desirability of permitting a person to vent his spleen
freely, it is perhaps not unreasonable to suggest that a person who has
intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress on another has gone
farther than simply providing a healthy outlet to his emotions.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it should be made clear that the foregoing is not neces-
sarily an argument for the carrying over en masse into the emotional-
distress context the set of qualified privileges available to a defendant in
a defamation suit. Rather, it is submitted that the qualified-privilege
approach is more likely to facilitate clarity of analysis and to provide a
more sensible manner for accommodating the competing interests involved
in the emotional-distress cases than does the present "outrageousness"
requirement.
